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Transcript
Don Nicoll: It is Tuesday, May 2nd, 2000, about one thirty in the afternoon. We are at One
Massachusetts Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C. in the offices of the Center for National Policy
interviewing Maureen Steinbruner. And would you give me your full name, spell it, and your
date and place of birth.
Maureen Steinbruner: My name is Maureen Strain Steinbruner, I use the middle initial ‘S’,
it’s my maiden name. It’s M-A-U-R-E-E-N, S-T-R-A-I-N, S-T-E-I-N-B-R-U-N-E-R,
Steinbruner. My date of birth was April 16th, 1941, in San Francisco, California.
DN: Did you grow up in California?
MS: I did, and I grew up in a family of Californians. My mother was born in California also,
and I think her mother was born in California, which is very unusual.
DN: Very extraordinary.
MS: And I have sisters, a sister who has next generation California children and next-next
generation, so that’s pretty amazing.

DN: Was your father from California also?
MS: No, my father was from Ireland. He emigrated as a young man of about eighteen and
came to this country, first to Philadelphia, then to Alaska, and then ended up in California.
DN: Had he left for economic reasons?
MS:

Yes, he was from Ireland and kind of an Angela’s Ashes sort of story.

DN: Now, what kind of political environment was the family?
MS: Well, my parents were Democrats. My father, though, had a very interesting if you will
anti-government, anti-politics attitude. I believe a combination, created by a combination of his
growing up in a state, Irish state ruled by Britain and absorbing the anti-regime attitudes of that.
But also, interestingly, when he was in Alaska, he was working on a project, railroad
construction crew for a lot of Norwegians and Swedes and he was given some Karl Marx to read,
and it’s kind of comported in some ways with his view of the world.
He was self-educated; he had a third grade formal education, but very bootstrap. He was always
going to school as long as I knew him. And something about the, you know, the government is
for the big guys, not the little guys and all of that he absorbed in a very non-radical, nonaggressive way. It just made him very skeptical about things that political people said.
DN: Were either he or your mother active in politics?
MS: No, not at all, and again I think my mother certainly was of the plain variety person who
didn’t have any particular interest in politics, any background or reason to be interested in it, but
ended up having some fairly strong, what you would call progressive views, I think. She, she
was very ahead of her time and culture I think with respect to roles for women. Again, not in a
radical or aggressive way. Tolerance of gays, that kind of thing, you know, so she was socially
progressive but didn’t ever see it in political terms.
And my father was almost anti-political. We were brought up, though, not cross picket lines. I
mean, he was, he had been in a union in earlier years as a plasterer. And I think very, they were
very representative of a certain part of the traditional, you know, forties, fifties Democrats with
great respect for and appreciation for Franklin Roosevelt and what he’d done for the country and
the country itself, but not much interest in political engagement as activists of any kind. They
just, they would not have seen that as a reasonable thing to do.
DN: Was there heavy emphasis on education, however?
MS: There was. As I said, my father was real bootstrap. My mother completed high school
but was a great appreciator of furthering education. They raised seven children, four not their
own, nephews and nieces adopted, nephews and a niece adopted when I was seven. And all of
us went through some form of higher education with I think one exception. But they also, I
think, didn’t, they didn’t see it as, how shall I say this? There’s a sort of professional family you

can grow up in that sees education as very integral to getting, you know, getting ahead
financially in life. They didn’t really see it that way; it was just something that you did to be the
best that you could be, to go as far you could in education.
DN: And so you went to Stanford? And what did you study there?
MS: I studied a lot of different things. I decided when, it was a very broad general studies
program, and beyond that I decided to major in journalism because I wasn’t really ready to pick
a major. And the design of the journalism major was kept going with the general studies
program. So, in a sense, I didn’t really major in a specific subject other than journalism. I did
concentrate on the social sciences but was very interested in the humanities also and did a fair
amount in sciences; very broad.
DN: And what led you to the Kennedy School?
MS: I was in Boston and had been working, I first got a job in Boston working in the public
relations department at Boston University, and that decided me against a career in public
relations. There were certain aspects of it I just knew I wouldn’t be good at and wouldn’t like
particularly. But it was great training, and I was trying to think about what to do with my life,
career wise. Tried urban planning, I was always very interested in cities and what they’re like
and how they get to be what they are. But I took some courses at MIT in that and in the political
science department and wasn’t quite sitting right as far as where I really wanted to go. And I
happened to find out about the Kennedy School starting this new prog-, starting, the Kennedy
School itself starting and starting a public policy program, and as I learned more about it I
thought, gee, that’s just the right thing, so I did that.
DN: Who were some of your instructors in the, were you in the joint urban studies, that
Harvard-MIT program?
MS: No, I took some urban planning courses at MIT and some of the people there were
probably in the joint center, but that wasn’t anything I did directly. At the Kennedy School, my
professors were Dick Neustadt, Richard Neustadt, Graham Allison, who subsequently became
the dean, Howard Raifa from the business school, Tom Shelling. It was actually an incredible
faculty first beginnings of that program, and subsequently.
DN: And your primary focus was domestic policy, I think.
MS: It was, I had at that point in addition to having a child I’d changed jobs, had done a
research project in juvenile delinquency at Boston University and then gone to work for the state
government in health planning. And that was the logical path, was domestic policy.
DN: And after you graduated from the Kennedy School, where did you go?
MS: I had another child, and I went back to work in health planning for the state. And I did
that for, I can’t remember, a little while, and left that to run a state commission on conversion of
the old military bases. Richard Nixon decided to close a lot of bases in Massachusetts and

Rhode Island in 1973. People thought it wasn’t accidental that he kind of picked on, or seemed
to be picking on Massachusetts, as they hadn’t voted for him. I don’t know that that was the
case, but in any event they closed five major facilities in one sweep. And the state put together a
bipartisan, in effect, bicameral, local, state task force to come up with some reuse proposals, and
I was the staff director and we created a permanent state agency to acquire property and help
redevelop it. It was a lot of fun really; there was a great deal of political support for doing
something constructive. I learned a lot.
DN: And did you go from there to Connecticut and the -?
MS: I did, I, my former husband, my then husband left a job he had teaching at Harvard and
went to the School of Organization and Management at Yale when it was getting started, and so
we were there for two years. I wanted to go on and do local economic development or state
economic development, but they had actually a good team in Connecticut at the time, and there
wasn’t a slot. And I ended up taking a job with the state education department in Hartford to
develop a planning program for them.
DN: And what led you to Washington?
MS: Again, my former husband, my then husband came here to become the head of foreign
policy studies at the Brookings Institution. So we came down here, our family moved here at the
end of ‘78 I guess, yeah.
DN: And did, you did not go to work for the center until 1981.
MS: The center wasn’t in existence, and I was leaving the government and joined with some
other folks who were, in a sense, the organizing group to start the center.
DN: What led you into that group?
MS: It’s interesting. The specific person who led me into that group was Greg Craig who is
now representing Elian Gonzalez, it’s a funny moment to be mentioning his name in that history.
But I had been working at HEW first for the undersecretary and then in the planning office. It
was HHS at that point. I was there just as the split off of the education department was taking
place. I actually, I had a great view of what was then the Carter administration’s social welfare
domestic policy agenda because I was working directly for the undersecretary and DN: And that was?
MS: It was Hale Champion. And he managed much of the legislative coordination for the
department with the White House, so all of the welfare reform then, national health insurance
then, it was a really interesting time to be doing that. But, as I observed, the Carter
administration and its debates about policy, it, I had spent a lot of time in my career and in my
practice, public policy practice if you will, thinking about the economy in one way or the other.
And specifically on that issue it seemed to me that the, the country in a sense was losing its sense
of consensus about economic policy. And it seemed to me a combination of a substantive

argument and some political issues, very different points of view about, you see it in the China
debate today really, China permanent trade normalization.
And I came to the conclusion that the country needed a good new kind of think tank I guess. I
didn’t know where it should be or what that really meant in a sense, but one that would focus on
some rethinking of some key policy areas. And so I was running around talking to everybody I
could find that I knew to talk about this. I was much more of a substantive than a political
person at that point. And so I randomly picked people I thought, like Richard Neustadt, who
would have some sense of the political process. The group that was forming the center got
together at the end of 1980, and one of the people I had talked to was Greg Craig, and he told me
about this meeting, and he said, “I think you might be interested in this.” So I went.
DN: And then you ultimately, when it was formed, you became a research director.
MS: Yes, you know, I started out going to the post office and doing things like that and then
became in effect the deputy research director. We didn’t have a research director, and the then
president didn’t think I was senior enough for the job, which I wouldn’t have been, you know, in
a sense, absolutely. But we were pretty small and pretty under-funded, so by force of
circumstance I got the job.
DN: And was Senator Muskie involved with the center at that time?
MS: He was, he was invited to be on the first board if I’m recalling correctly. I had not been a
Muskie person, although many of the people, I hadn’t been anybody’s person, I hadn’t had that
kind of political engagement. Many of the people who were around at the beginning were in
some way or another, Madeleine Albright for example, was at one of the first meetings. And
when the board was put together it was, you know, kind of a panoply of famous formers and I
think former, then former Secretary Muskie at that point, was invited to be on the board very
early on.
I don’t remember seeing much of him in the early days, although we did, we started this fund
raising event and gave a distinguished public service award, and he was actually the recipient of
the first award, which is interesting. We’ve now named the award in his honor, his memory. He
became active, really active, when Cyrus Vance decided to step down in 1984.
DN: Cy was the first chairman?
MS: He was actually the second. Terry Sanford, former Governor Sanford, former Senator
Sanford, he was then former governor and had been back to run for the senate. And he did it for
a year, a year and a half, and I don’t know why he decided to leave at that point but he did and
Cy then took over the chairmanship. And he continued until, I want to say ‘84, maybe the end of
‘84, and they recruited Muskie to step up and become the chairman.
DN: So you had a chance to work with Cy Vance and then Ed Muskie.
MS:

Yes, I did, yeah, yeah. Warren Christopher was actually on the board at the time, too.

We have a great track record with particularly Democratic secretaries of state, you know.
DN: Now, there’s a fairly heavy involvement by foreign policy people. Has this been the
emphasis of the center?
MS: The center’s emphasis has shifted a bit over the years, but there’s always been a foreign
policy component to it. It didn’t really, it was never the central focus, I think that’s fair to say,
even when Madeleine Albright was president, and that was certainly an area of interest to her.
But it’s always been a component.
DN: And do you remember your first encounter with Senator, Secretary Muskie?
MS: I think I do. Setting aside that dinner in which we honored him because I did not actually,
I don’t think I said a word to him. And I don’t remember him being at a board meeting. But the
thing I remember specifically, there must have been encounters before this, but my first real
personal interaction that I recall came, it sort of, two thirds of the way through 1985 if I’m
remembering this correctly, when the then president of the center, Ted van Dyke was leaving.
And he left a little bit precipitously, he decided to go, he was kind of, a bit of an impulsive guy,
and went. And we didn’t have a new president.
DN: Was he the first president?
MS: He was the first president, and he was very instrumental in getting the center organized,
and he knew Muskie among others.
DN: Oh, this is the Ted van Dyke who used to work for Hubert Humphrey.
MS: Exactly, yeah, yeah. So we were very tiny and very fragile and, you know, and at that
point I was still the research director, and what had happened is we’d actually shrunk a bit in
terms of staff. So I decided to go talk to the chairman, and I did. I talked to him privately, and I
said, “You know, this is a serious situation and it needs some hands on help is my view.” We
didn’t have an endowment or anything, you know in it, so having a CEO gone out the door was
serious.
And I, as I recall, I said to him, you know, I think what we should think about is that you become
acting president in your role as chairman, and I will be acting executive vice president, a job that
wasn’t filled at that point. In effect, run the place while we find a new chair. And he agreed to
do that. I guess he thought that was a reasonable option. I didn’t put two options on the table,
so.
DN: He didn’t insist on others?
MS: He didn’t. And, you know, I was, I had had experience staffing people and dealing with
political people and everything, but I did not know this man really, and I didn’t have a sense of
the drill on what he, you know, what style of approach he would be most happy with. And so I
just bowled on in there, no prep, no memo ahead of time, you know. And really it was, there

were things about it that I thought probably didn’t want to go on paper anyway, you know, sort
of inside business. So I’m sure he was, I can’t say for sure, but I think he was probably a little
taken aback.
DN: But how did he handle it?
MS: He handled it very, in a very Muskie-like way. He, first of all I think, if I’m recalling
correctly, I think when I went to talk to him I’m not sure if he actually knew yet that Ted was
definitely leaving because I remember him being a little, and maybe I didn’t know that he didn’t
know. It just, I can see the scene in his office at General Park. He was brusque and a little
uncomfortable, which was characteristic of him when he was caught off unawares, in my later
experience. But very able to come to a decision, which in some ways was not characteristic. I
mean, when I saw him later he agonized a lot about things that he thought mattered.
And I think what I saw in this instance was different from later because it was something that
was immediate, and he felt a certain kind of responsibility that is very different from when
you’re dealing with a policy area and you’re deciding what recommendation to make. You
know, you’re not the decision maker, you’re not the accountable person, particularly in his later
career. So this was a different, a side of him that I saw more at the beginning when we were
engaged over what to do with this little organization, than later when I got involved in foreign
policy with him. I was scared to death, I think that’s the fair thing to say. Very intimidated, you
know.
DN: Did he agree on the spot to your recommendation?
MS: My recollection is that he did. Now, you know, I may have then put it in a memo for him
or something to him, I can’t, I can no longer remember that. I may have some papers somewhere
on this. But my recollection is that there wasn’t a lot of hemming and hawing, you know, in the
event. That he kind of saw it as a way to move forward.
DN: Did he deal with Ted van Dyke at that point?
MS: To be honest with you, I don’t remember. It got very muddled because there was a trip to
China that Ted had organized as a fund raising tool for the center that Ed Muskie was leading for
us that took place. Carole [Parmelee] probably would remember this probably, the dates, but I
think it took place I want to say like August of ‘85. And as I recall what happened, that it was
one of these things where, you know, he had one sort of vision about what was supposed to be
happening and it didn’t quite get there and it kind of disorganized a little bit at the end. But it
happened, it came off and we got, you know, a couple of people came on our board who are still
on our board who came on that trip, terrific people.
But as I recall the sequence, basically Ted only let Senator Muskie know that he was definitely
resigning as the trip was kind of going off. And it was like, we’re coming back, I’m taking some
vacation and I’m leaving. It kind of burned in my brain, you know, that statement. So, again, as
I recall what happened, they go off to China, I did not go on the trip, and Muskie probably was
dealing with this issue in his own mind on the trip. You know, what to do when he came back.

So I really don’t know what the interaction between them was. And actually I never felt it was
my business to ask him, you know, later.
DN: Did, in the months following, I assume you worked very closely with him.
MS: I did. I did not work closely with him on the issue of recruiting, not terribly closely on
the issue of recruiting a new president. He worked with some other board members on that. The
one who was particularly responsible for getting the next president was Dick Moe, who had been
a Walter Mondale staffer and at that point was out in law practice, now runs the National Trust
for Historic Preservation. And Dick was a friend of Kirk O’Donnell’s who they recruited, whom
they recruited to be our next president. And I had a little bit of interaction over that but not a
whole lot. But over the running of the center on a day to day basis, you know, he was my, my
base to touch.
DN: What was it like dealing with him about the management of the center?
MS: It was a challenge because, I think, first of all, reasonably so, he didn’t take on the
chairmanship to become involved in the day to day management and wasn’t particularly
interested in doing that sort of thing. But he always, again, when he needed to make a decision,
that was my impression, and I got, as we got into it I did the right paper thing as I recall anyway.
So I wasn’t walking in the door and just presenting him with wild suggestions after that.
He would respond, you know. He might want to talk about it, he might want to beat you up a
little bit over it. You know, wasn’t there a better option. That was very characteristic. But in
the end, again, with this very practical, this has to be decided, he would decide it. So that didn’t
last too long because as I recall the trip was already, oh dear, I’ve forgotten when. We had
some, we had one very difficult issue which I can only say a little bit about on the record. And it
had to do with our finances, and some issues relating to how the board was responding to that in
particular one board member. And there’s no way for me to say because I don’t want to say
exactly what was going on, but it was very tricky and difficult. And he handled that well, he
essentially let me put some information on the table for people to see that he knew needed to be
on the table, when it needed to be on the table if I can put it that way. And didn’t duck it, which
is important.
And it was a very critical thing because it was necessary for the new president to sort of know
what exactly the situation was that he was walking into, and he would not necessarily have
known that if we hadn’t sort of gone through this exercise. So, again, that was somebody who,
you know, saw his responsibilities and was stepping up to the plate. That’s the way I would
characterize it.
DN: How did he relate on a personal level with his fellow board members in a situation like
that?
MS: He always had an air of, a combination of, you know, he has a, had a friendly sort of
manner, liked to tell jokes. You know, many of them pretty, uh, what’s the right word, barnyardy. But to tell you the truth I think there was a certain distance there, that would be my

perception of it anyway. That he liked many of these people and liked the fact that he was on the
board and had, you know, the leadership role there. But I did not see with most of them anyway
a great deal of personal closeness, would be the way I would say it. It might have been there,
and I didn’t observe it, but I didn’t see it. Yeah.
DN: How did he deal with you as a key staff member over the months?
MS: It’s really interesting, my experience with him I would bet Madeleine Albright and Karen
Hastie Williams and people, women like that, I would be surprised if there wasn’t a similar
version of this which is, he, I think he always treated me like a staff member, which is to say as a
person, first and foremost. And was perfectly happy to beat up on me when he felt like beating
up on someone, which that was part of his style was to either, you know, kill the messenger or
kill the message and figure out what he thought through that process. I mean, I didn’t learn until
much later to watch it from that perspective, but I’m saying that because I don’t get the sense
that there was ever a time when he said to himself, you know, this is a female person and so she
can’t be in this job or in this role, or I can’t, you know, I can’t have her doing this. I never got
that sense.
He was awkward about the role of women in his own sort of conscious way. He, you know,
something about the way he would make jokes and things. I think he was, he is very smart,
that’s the thing about Ed Muskie, very smart. And I think he completely realized that while we
have differences that are to do with gender in terms of style and ability and things like that, that,
you know, in the end people are people and you look at them as people, and that’s the right thing
to do to get a product out, get a result. And that was at one level.
The other level was his acculturation, you know, he came from a very traditional family, he had
a very traditional marriage and, you know, he had both sons and daughters. I mean he, you
know, I think all of that he was wrestling with. But not in a, not in a way that seemed to me to
get in his way, you know. He did, when I decided to, I decided to get in the race for president of
the Center for National Policy twice. The first time I did it not because, neither time I would say
I desperately wanted the job, but the first time I didn’t even really want to be a candidate
seriously, but it was at a point when I was becoming more, I had to figure out how to be more
political, and I realized I had to get into the process, you know, I needed for the sake of
continuity here, I wanted to get into the process. And the way I decided to do that, rightly or
wrongly, was to say I want to talk about whether I should be a candidate.
The second time, which is the time I ended up being president, I, and he was still chairman, I had
decided at that point that I wasn’t sure given the state the Center was in that there would be an
appropriate candidate, so I’d better step up to the plate. And both times, certainly the first time,
he decided that I could not do the job and believed I was actually presenting myself to be a
candidate. This was my not being very good at this that led to that, not, all the board didn’t
understand what I was trying to do because I couldn’t communicate it appropriately. And I don’t
think that judgment had, I mean it may have had to do with my being female, but I don’t think
so. I think it was about me, okay, and I think he, I think that was the right judgment. I mean I
shared it, you know.

The second time, again I think he was, it was really interesting. I think he wanted me to be able
to do it. He didn’t want to lobby me into position to do it and he didn’t want to push me to do it,
and I don’t think he even wanted to decide that I should be the person to do it. But at some level
I think he was, he meant, his instincts were that I should be able to do it, if you know what I
mean. He’d changed his view. I’d changed, and he adjusted his view.
DN: But you found his social relationship with staff members who were women awkward.
MS: I guess I wouldn’t so much, well maybe awkward is the word to describe it. He was
always, he always seemed to be operating on two levels, okay? On one level, at the same time,
on one level there was the business, and you were doing it, and it was no problem. On another
level it was like he was watching himself saying, how could I possibly be, you know, sitting here
with this female person in this role? And it always seemed to me that ‘A’ was more important
than ‘B’ in the event, but ‘B’ was there. I thought so anyway, you know.
DN: Do you remember any of those instances where he was beating up on you?
MS: Yes, I do. How could one forget. I was thinking about this. There were lots. I primarily
saw it or remember it anyway having to do with the foreign policy things we did. And I worked
for much of the time that he and I worked together on issues related to Vietnam and Cambodia,
U.S. policy. I worked together with two other people, neither of whom worked at the Center but
both of whom were involved in the projects that we were doing. One is a woman named Andrea
Paneritis who is the executive director of the Christopher Reynolds Foundation, and, they funded
what we did. And the other is a guy named Tom Vallely who is with the Harvard Institute for
International Development, who had been a Marine in Vietnam. Great guy, both terrific people,
wonderful, smart people. And they really brought the project to the Center and then worked very
closely. They knew a lot about the current situation in, then current situation in Vietnam and
Cambodia and took, organized the trips, the first trips that Muskie took, and we were kind of costaffers. They worked, we worked together on speech drafts, and, you know, it was a real staff
team.
DN: What was the object of the project?
MS: The object was to try to get a more objective, or at least a more open view of U.S. policy
in the late eighties, early nineties. You know, we were basically on a anti-Vietnam at all costs
track and, in many respects. And there were things going on to try to bring the political system
to a different view of what should happen, and this was part of it. And much of the work that we
did together, we would be in these situations in which we’d be preparing, you know, either
thoughts for Senator Muskie to decide what he, what his views were, you know, options and
things like that, or speech drafts. And he would beat the living daylights out of not only the
material but us. He had a tendency, which I found got pretty wearing, didn’t get in the way of
your respect or your fondness for him I would say. And perhaps others didn’t find it as difficult
in the moment, but I just found it, I’m a person who likes to debate and discuss, but he had a way
of personalizing it, you know, he really wanted to beat you back personally into a corner. It’s,
you know, attorney with a hostile witness or something like that.

DN: Did you have a sense of why he seemed to want to do that?
MS: Well, I developed some theories about it; I don’t know whether they’re any good or not.
But I came to believe that he was very insecure in effect, in his political role, remarkably so. I
mean, and I don’t think, I shouldn’t say, I have no reason to be terribly interpretive here, but it
didn’t strike me as it was, as I saw him, that this was necessarily simply a product of what
happened in the presidential election or anything like that. It seemed to me to come, he made
some comments at various times about he never would have thought to run for president if he
hadn’t been selected as Humphrey’s vice presidential candidate because he came from a small
state.
And I think he felt very self conscious in a sense in Washington as being, you know, not one of
the big guys in the big state sense, and not very sure of himself, actually. And it, I think that it, it
was both a way of testing his own ideas, this kind of very argumentative, personalized
argumentative style. But it also I think, you know, was a way, it was an emotional reaction to
reinforce his sense of himself and that he was in charge. That’s what I came to think it was
about.
DN: Did those episodes or kinds of handling of the issues vary according to the issue? Were
some less important, therefore less tense than others? Or was -?
MS: Well, I’ll tell you, the only issues that I dealt with him on directly were ones that were
inevitably tension provoking because he was putting. Inherently he was a very conservative man
in the sense of, you know, not wanting to be out there shouting, flame throwing, things like that.
And he was also brave, and he was walking out on some policy limbs in these areas, and, you
know, it made him, I think, anxious. He always did it, I mean he took, I think he always took
what he thought was the right, he came to the place that he believed he should be, and he said
that, devil take the hindmost at that point, you know. And again, he wasn’t, wasn’t out there
carrying picket signs or anything, but he was putting his then considerable reputation on the line,
so.
DN: Can you remember some of those specific issues?
MS: Well, the issue of what he would say about Cambodia when we came back the first time
was really the most intense, and we went, you know, that sort of, everything evolved from that.
And the United States government at that point was, this is very much underappreciated in the
public domain here, but we were basically on the side of the team that the Khmer Rouge was on.
We were, we the country, the United States government was supporting the posture of the socalled coalition of which the Khmer Rouge was a part.
We had, in fact when Senator Muskie was secretary of state was part of the time that we did this,
the United States voted to keep the Khmer Rouge in the seat at the United Nations even though
the Vietnamese had thrown them out. They had taken over the government, not with a
democratic election, terrible, you know, not a happy chapter in our history. The feelings on
Vietnam as you know run deep to this day, and he was basically saying, “You got to let it go, the
Vietnamese are out of here.” We were saying, part of this so-called road map of Vietnam’s

normalization at that point, the United States was saying we have to have verified information
that you actually have pulled out of Cambodia, but we will not send anyone in to verify. I mean,
we were getting deeper and deeper into a really peculiar posture.
So he called on the United States to verify the Vietnamese withdrawal. He said, “I’ve been
there; they’re out of there. You know, go in and look, as best as I can tell.” He called on the
United States government to deal directly with the Vietnamese government and with the
Cambodian government and not to do everything through the surrogacy of the Soviet Union.
And, most important really, although people wouldn’t have realized why, he said we should not
be doing anything to support the Khmer Rouge.
And he came to those three positions, you know, over, and he came to them and won
(unintelligible word) soon, but he stuck with it, and he scrolled it out. And I was in meetings in
that time period with senior American policy makers that made it clear that, you know, he still
had a lot to, I don’t want to say fear, but there was going to be a cost to be extracted for taking
this position, okay. And what did he need that for, you know? But he did it.
DN: What kind of a cost?
MS: Oh, political tarnishing. There was one incredibly amazing meeting we were in where
somebody, a senior person, was saying to him, “You know, you are one of those Democrats who
betrayed the country, one of those senate Democrats who betrayed the country by being against
the Vietnam War at a certain stage.” Not early on but, I mean in effect that’s what was being
said to him. And that whole era hung around the necks of all of those people who were involved,
and he felt that and, you know, that was on the one hand. On the other hand, people like Mary
McGrory, he wasn’t going far enough fast enough or, I mean she was very appreciative when he
finally clearly said he was for normalization with Vietnam which was a later step in our process.
He was one of the first senior American political leaders to say that.
Probably the first former secretary of state to say that, and you know, that was, sticks and stones,
you know, won’t break my bones but that’s politics and people who are in politics, that’s what
they pay attention to is, you know, who says what, because that’s what they live and die on. So
he was very sensitive to that.
DN: Was the senior person who made what certainly sounds like an implied threat a foreign
service officer, or a political figure, and if so a Democrat or a Republican?
MS: I think that I shouldn’t say that because I don’t want to pin this person to the wall. I think
in the circumstances that it was not actually an implied threat from that person. I think it was
meant to be sure that he understood what he was taking on here to tell you the truth. I think it
was a warning, as it was delivered at the time. So, and I don’t want to, that’s why I don’t want to
say anything more about who that was, but it was in a context in which. I was in that meeting
and another one with another senior policy maker and in both instances, this is where the guy’s
courage came to the fore, you know, he rode right through that. He rode right through it in both
cases. There was another instance in which . . . .

End of Side A
Side B
DN: This is the second side of the May 2nd interview with Maureen Steinbruner at the Center
for National Policy. We have been talking about the Center for National Policy and Ed Muskie’s
role, and some of the roles he was playing in the foreign policy field. What is the way in which
the Center functions, and how does it carry out its objectives?
MS: The Center is in some respects essentially a platform for the assembly of alternatives for
public policy. And by that I mean we function with a very small core staff. And when we either
are approached by someone from the outside world or within our own, from our own research,
decide that there is a policy arena in which organizing in effect a very current and potentially
new view of the problem is a useful thing to do, then we reach out and bring people together to
either on paper or in person in effect to do that.
And people who associate with us either as members of our board or in some other way have a
relationship here, and we maintain a broad network of relationships, will play roles in and
around these policy projects as appropriate bringing their backgrounds and expertise to the
situation.
In this case, we had the help as I mentioned before of some people who knew a lot about what
was happening in Vietnam and Cambodia in a time period in which really very, very few
Americans had the opportunity to go there and to make any kind of on the scene judgment at all.
So we were very fortunate to get a network of people who actually had some experience. They
were all, by and large, pretty pro-normalization people. So we made a determined effort to reach
out to some people who were not pro normalization and be sure that, as this book I just brought
you called Exploring Cambodia, which we produced as a record of Senator Muskie’s activities
on the Cambodia issue. You will see in there an interview with Mr. Khieu Samphan who was
the representative of the Khmer Rouge at the United Nations, so not only the spectrum in the
United States but really outside that. You know, he wanted to talk to everybody and that’s, we
try at a certain level to do that, to be broad in our outreach.
We typically try to work with people who have background and experience in the political
process on issues. They bring to that something that you can’t hire, frankly, so the role that he
took here was that steering, guiding role. He chaired a task force we had on a transition project
in ‘88, and we had a terrific group of people. Paul Volker was involved, Senator Bill Bradley
was involved in it for a while, Bobby Inmann, really great, you know, six or seven or eight folk.
And it was a similar thing, we did some staff work, we rounded up a lot of people who wrote
staff papers about what should happen and published that in a book called, Senator Muskie and I
had a lot of debates about the title as I recall. We ended up calling it his title, which is America
Tomorrow, the Choices We Face, and if you want to see a good precis of what eventually
happened in budget policy actually, you would do worse than to read that book. I’m very, you
know, proud of what we able to do there.
So that was his role. He didn’t, you know, he didn’t write the papers, but he, when we would do
a speech that he was going to deliver, he knew what he wanted, and you worked at it until you

got it. And he took suggestions, I mean he was very open to--- I ended up doing a lot of drafting
of speeches for a while there for him and I loved it because first of all he had a very, he always
had a very sensible view, but in addition to that he wanted to inspire. And so together, you
know, we crafted some I think really nice language, and he delivered it just incredibly
effectively, and it was really fun.
DN: Did he influence the choice of areas of focus for the Center?
MS: He influenced it in a very light touch way. He, at board meetings he would make
suggestions, he would stir the discussion when there was, you know, a set of, when there was a
conversation about what areas we should be going into. He really cared about budget policy, and
he wanted to be sure we were doing some things in that area, which we did. And other than that
it was, you know, it was more, I mean he did not walk into the room every time with a very
specific agenda, which is good because for an organization like this you can’t have one person
thinking that they’re still, you know, running their senate shop and thinking up things to do. It’s
not like that. So he was very good in that way, really.
DN: Do you remember any specific instances where you were working hard on a speech with
him and he pushed you?
MS: I can think of two instances, and neither one is actually a speech, but the scene reminds
me of, I think the speeches actually ended up being less, somewhat less this way. We were
going to do, well let me start with the first one. We were in Phnom Penh. It was our first trip,
and we had started out and done briefings in Thailand and briefings in Hanoi and gone to Saigon
and driven from Saigon to Phnom Penh; that was really an incredible adventure, 1979, ‘89, ‘79,
no, ‘89, sorry, I’m losing my grip here.
And it was getting to be the end of the trip and it was, the next, we were scheduled, he had
insisted that we go to Angor Wat, really insisted, and there was no way to get there. And, you
know, the war was still going on. It wasn’t going on right in Phnom Penh but. So the prime
minister Hun Sen, and, being pressed by Senator Muskie, agreed to get a military helicopter to
take us up there and we were to get up and go to the airport at the crack of dawn.
In the meantime it was getting close the end of the trip and we knew when we came out, he had
to do a press conference in Bangkok and say something. And so he was wanting an options
paper. And he was really wrestling. I mean, I think, you know, it was that hard, we all ran into
this, you’re at the hard point when you have to decide what do you really think, you know. And
so we worked late into the night. I remember I must have had a typewriter or something, typing
on Andrea’s bed. We didn’t have any facilities; there wasn’t any computer, and got it to him late
at night but enough time for him to read it, okay? I guess we stayed up late one night and then
got it to him the next night.
And so we get up the next morning and we get in the car, and nothing is said, okay. And we get
out to the airport and this is a, there’s nobody at the air-, this is not a functioning airport in any
serious way at the time. And we’re sitting out there on this little ledge waiting for our military
guys to turn up, and finally I, you know, we’re kind of looking at each other, and so I kind of

sidled over and, “So, senator,” which is what I called him, “did you get a chance to look at your
options memo?” And I’m telling you, we had agonized about this, strategized and agonized, and
we just thought it was a killer options paper. And he looks at me, looks at the other two and says
in this tone of voice something like, “Well, nothing new there.” You know, just like squelched.
So, I mean it was just, it was hopeless because there was no guidance, you know, nothing about
what was wrong with it. I just, you know, I think now it’s possible he hadn’t even read it. I, you
know, playing this video back in my head, I don’t know because. But, or he had read it, and he
just couldn’t cope with it. I mean whatever we’d offered up didn’t work for him, you know.
DN: From your point of view, was there anything new in the memo?
MS: Yeah, we thought so. I mean he eventually came out with basically this approach, there
was, it was incremental, but it was-, I think the thing that I found hardest about working with
him, and I don’t know that anyone else had this experience, it might have been my limitation
here. I found it very difficult to get into a political discussion with him. I don’t mean, you
know, big public politics but little ‘p,’ operational politics. He didn’t, it’s almost as if strategy
and maneuvering and all those things that you have to do, and, you know, if we do this, who will
do what, that he didn’t really want to be thought to be doing that. Do you know what I mean?
Does that make sense?
DN: It’s absolutely consistent.
MS: And it made it very damned, excuse me, very damn difficult to strategize, you know. So
how, so what’s wrong with these options, is the substance, is it the politics, is it the way they’re
framed? “No, just bring me something else.” So we got there, but that was a real crusher.
The other time was when we were trying to draft a potential article for, to submit to Foreign
Affairs or something like that about Vietnam, and, this was later, and we’d done another trip, or
we were heading for another trip. I think we were just planning to do another trip to Vietnam to
deal directly with the Vietnam piece of this. And I just researched up a storm. I really worked
hard on putting some background. And we were, and we wrote the article to try to point up some
of the ambiguities if you will in the U.S. policy line, one of which was how the bombing of
Cambodia was treated at the time, and then how the, in the negotiations in Paris, what was really
going on, and then how we ended up supporting the Khmer Rouge as a way of sticking it to the
Vietnamese basically.
You know, there was a lot of things in there that I think he agreed with, but in the end he was not
prepared to put his name on that piece of paper. And we had some really difficult discussions
about that, and they were difficult because they were not, it was not so much he was saying,
“This is wrong, I don’t agree with this, okay?” That was not what was being said. It’s that, “I’m
not going to, this is not something I am going to put my name on,” you know? Well, why not?
DN: Did he articulate why?
MS:

No, that was the, I mean it was always, you know, it was always turned around as beating

up on you for some little inconsistency or quibbling or argument which you couldn’t, you know,
on the spot. I’m a writer, not a debater, you know, I could never think of the right comeback.
But he would get pretty heated, and, you know, when he got heated and started yelling at people,
then we sort of backed off. I will say one other thing, I’m going to say this, I want to say this on
the record. A couple of times, he took off after my compatriots in this exercise in a very nasty
and personal way in the heat of the moment in some situation in which I’m sure from his
perspective, you know, we had staffed him into some impossible corner that he couldn’t see a
way out of. I completely can understand what was going on in his mind. But, for whatever
reason he wasn’t able to articulate it in a way that would allow us to get out of the situation, and
he would get very frustrated, and more frustrated and angry, and he said some very personally
hurtful things to people. Not to me, actually, that I remember anyway.
And that’s the one thing that I’m sorry about, you know. I wish he hadn’t done that. I wish, I
wish, I guess what I mean is I wish he hadn’t felt the impulse to do that, for his sake as much as
for the people who were the targets of this because it was a lessening, you know, of the really
outsized personality that he was. You know, nobody’s perfect, I mean, that was kind of in a way
one of his DN: Did he apologize to them afterwards?
MS: Not in so many words. He obviously felt bad and, you know, wanted to. I mean one time
I actually, I had forgotten about this but he said something, and I can’t remember what it was,
but it was, Andrea and Tom will remember, and I’ll probably recall eventually. But he, we were
sitting over a meal in this government guest establishment at Phnom Pen in this same original
trip, and he said something to Tom Vallely, and I cannot remember what it was. But I felt I had
to defend this former Marine, and I can remember sort of leaping in and saying, “You can’t say
that to him,” or something along those lines. And I thought, I heard what I was saying and kind
of fell back, you know. But DN: How did he react to that?
MS: He heard me. It was very interesting. I mean, it was clear he realized he had gone over
the line, he let go, you know. I mean, we all need to let go. I mean you get stressed, and that
just was his ventilation, you know, had to have a target. Plus it, you know, it wasn’t a lot but it
was a part of it, yeah.
DN: As he got older did he change at all?
MS: Yeah, now I didn’t see him early, you know, but even over the time I knew him he
mellowed, sure. He mellowed in the sense that he found it easier to let you know that he really
thought you were great, you know, which he was a little parsimonious about in the earlier years.
I think he, for whatever reason, you know, he wasn’t great at sort of patting people on the back.
But he would get, later with various people I knew that he cared about and respected.
Madeleine’s one, the people I worked with on this project. He would say very nice things about

them, not necessarily when they were there, you know, but knowing they’d get the message
back. And it, they were very nice things because they took account of the qualities of these
people and their abilities I guess is a better word that registered, you know, a respect that he was
paying to them. And it came across that way. And he meant it, too, I think.
DN: Did he express in any way, any specific ways, what he found important or valuable in the
Center?
MS: Hmm, I’ve never thought about that. I would say not with words but with actions. He,
you know, he managed to carry on as chairman of this place for twelve years and through more
thin than thick as far as funding, and always was there, you know, when you needed him to be
there. And it was clear that he had other outlets for this, but this was one good place for him to
feel that he was pursuing the kind of, not cause exactly, but the public interest and to do it in a
way that supported an organization that was aimed at that as well.
DN: As you think about him and your working relationship with him, and your observations of
his involvement in public policy, what are the characteristics and qualities that come through to
you as most important, positive and negative?
MS: Well, first of all he was just, I said, is he’s smart, he was smart. He was very intelligent
and wise in some way, some important ways I think in the sense that he, and he thought a lot
about the country. I mean, he was of his generation; he had no problem thinking about the
country, you know, and positively thinking about his service to it. He always cared about Maine,
and he was always very loyal to Maine, but on the other hand, you know, he had a really strong
sense of himself as a participant in the United States government. So I think intelligence would
be very high.
And a sense of perspective, in a sense, you know. He had a good, I think, practical view of
politics, things come, they go, he was not very ideological at all, very practical, but a committed
Democrat certainly. And he liked it, you know, he liked his role. He liked getting a result, he
liked being able to figure out where the right place was and, you know, right in a sense for the,
correct for the country, and organizing himself to be there in that place, you know. That’s a very
useful political instinct and skill.
I just, I think the limitation is again that he sensed always that he was from, that somehow he
was from this small state, and he was kind of, you know, nobody was in the end, going to take
him all that seriously, in a way, in a funny way, even though they did. I’m not sure he ever
believed it. So it kind of limited him a little bit in what he decided to do. And this is, I mean
this is, know whether this is a strength or a weakness, but he really was, he always wanted to see
what he was doing in the kind of great civic minded spirit, you know. He really didn’t like
talking, at least with me, about the nitty-gritty of the things that have to be done to get a political
result.
And I think as time went on and we got into the eighties, he admired and indeed I think tried to
emulate Ronald Reagan’s inspirational abilities and style. But I think he, Muskie felt very put
off by the disintegration of the political dialogue into ever more, into ever narrower partisan

channels, you know. Everything about spin, everything about the game, that just was not his cup
of tea.
DN: One final question. Did your father, is your father still living?
MS:

No, a long time dead.

DN: Did he live long enough to see you in this position?
MS:

No, he didn’t.

DN: My guess is he’d be very happy with what you’re doing.
MS: He’d think it was a kick, probably, yeah, yeah. He’d, it’s interesting because we, good
training for Ed Muskie, we grew up with me being his in the house debate partner. He and I
would debate late at night, anything. No one else in the family interested in listening to us
having the debate. And I think we would have ended up having some incredibly provocative and
entertaining debates about public life, public service, and politics, you know.
DN: And you’re not in government.
MS:

Right.

DN: Thank you very much.
MS:

You’re very welcome. Happy to do it.

End of Interview

